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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DONALD D. GREGG, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
PATRICIA J. GREGG, 
De fend ant/Appellant 
Case No. 880384-CA 
Priority Classification 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon 
this Court by Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, which gives the Utah Court of Appeals appellate 
jurisdiction . over appeals from district courts involving 
divorce, property division and support. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
awarding Appellant alimony in the amount of only $700.00 per 
month and for only five years? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
limiting Appellant's designation as the beneficiary of 
Respondent's civil service spouse survivor annuity to 
-1-
$700.00 per month, and for only the five year alimony 
period? 
3. Did the trial court err in valuing Appellantfs 
Certificate of Deposit at $25,000.00, instead of $21,500.00? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
awarding Appellant only $500.00 attorney's fees from 
Respondent? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, 
the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, 
property, and parties . . . 
Section 75-6-107, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
No multiple-party account will be 
effective against an estate of a deceased 
party to transfer to a survivor sums 
needed to pay debts, taxes, and expenses 
of administration, including statutory 
allowances to the surviving spouse, minor 
children and dependent children, if other 
assets of the estate are insufficient. A 
surviving party, P.O.D. payee, or benefi-
ciary who receives payment from a 
multiple-party account after the death of 
a deceased party shall be liable to 
account to her personal representative 
for amounts the decedent owned 
beneficially immediately before his death 
to the extent necessary to discharge the 
claims and charges mentioned above 
remaining unpaid after application of the 
decedent's estate . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a 
final judgment of a decree of divorce and related relief, 
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and specifically, from the adequacy of the alimony award and 
attorneyfs fees award, 
2. Course of the Proceedings. Respondent filed a 
Complaint seeking a divorce from Appellant in Weber County 
District Court on August 4, 1987, and Appellant filed an 
Answer on September 1, 1987. Respondent requested a Pre-
Trial on September 18, 1987, and a Pre-Trial was set for 
November 9, 1987. Before the Pre-Trial, Appellant's 
counsel withdrew on October 28, 1987. On November 4, 1987, 
Appellant's new and present counsel filed an Amended Answer 
and Motion for Order to Show Cause, and, on November 20, 
1987, served Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
upon Respondent's Counsel. 
An Order was issued upon Appellant's Order To Show 
Cause and, after discovery and hearings, a trial was held on 
March 22 and 23, 1988 before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, presiding. A further hearing was had on May 4, 
1988, to clarify part of the Judge's Memorandum Opinion, 
issued March 29, 1988. 
3. Disposition at Trial Court. The Decree of 
Divorce was entered on May 16, 1988, awarding Appellant 
$700.00 per month as alimony for five years, and attorney's 
fees of $500.00. 
4. Statement of Facts. The parties married on 
July 21, 1979 and separated in about May of 1987 (Tr., at 20, 
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21). It was a third marriage for each party, and no 
children were born its issue (Tr., at 21). 
Respondent was sixty-two (62) at the time of the 
trial (Tr., at 22) and had worked full-time all of his adult 
life. At the time of the parties1 divorce, he had been 
retired from federal civil service since 1981 (Tr., at 25), 
and was selling real estate for the Wardley Corporation, 
with a total monthly income as follows: $335.00 from 
Wardley Corporation; $2,557.00 from federal Civil Service 
Retirement (R. , at 24) earned almost exclusively prior to 
marrying Appellant (R., at 24); approximately $900.00 from 
the contract sale of a home he owned prior to marrying the 
Appellant (R., at 26), which would continue at least four-
teen more years (Tr., at 28). His monthly gross income is 
$3,792.00 and his monthly net income is $3,381.00 (Tr., at 
29) . 
Appellant was fifty-one (51) years old at the time 
of trial (Tr., at 90). She had a high school degree and a 
year and a half of college in 1957, majoring in physical 
education (Tr., at 90.) Marrying for the first time at 
twenty (20), she had two (2) children and divorced at twenty-
three (23) (Tr., at 90-91). Appellant remarried again a 
short time after her divorce, had two more children, raised 
them, and divorced when she was forty-two (42) (Tr., at 
91-92). During her first two marriages, Appellant did not 
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work outside the home (Tr., at 92). When she divorced her 
second husband, Mr. Tippin, she received $900.00 per month 
alimony for seven years (Tr., 92-93). Mr. Tippin had been 
earning $45,000.00 per year as a metallurgical engineer 
(Tr., at 93). 
The parties married in June, 1979, less than one 
year after Appellantfs divorce from Mr. Tippin. At the time 
of their marriage, both parties were debt-free (Tr., at 67). 
Respondent owned significant premarital assets which he 
placed in a living trust (Tr., at 85, and see Trial Exhibit 
2D in Record Supplemental Package, Trust Agreement of Donald 
Gregg, dated June 20, 1979). He valued the non-income pro-
ducing assets at $85,400.00 and those were Exhibit A to the 
Trust Agreement. Additionally, Respondent had numerous 
other assets which he placed in the Trust as Exhibit B. 
Most notably, there was a civil service spouse survivor's 
annuity which provided income of $1,250.00 per month, and a 
$43,000.00 Civil Service Life Insurance Policy (Tr., at 
85-87), both with Appellant listed as their designated 
beneficiary. Respondent made Appellant aware of these pro-
visions when they married (Tr., at 97-98). Appellant owned 
some real property at the time of the parties1 marriage, 
including a condominium with a $358.00 per month payment, 
and a late model Pacer automobile (Tr., at 95). 
During their marriage, the parties enjoyed an upper 
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middle class lifestyle. Respondent supported Appellant com-
pletely (Tr., at 74-75). Appellant did the household chores 
(Tr., at 70-71). The parties lived in a very nice condomin-
ium and took numerous trips and vacations, all paid for by 
Respondent out of his monthly civil service retirement, 
Wardley income and house contract sale proceeds (Tr., at 82, 
122-123). 
During the last three or four years, Appellant was 
part owner of a beauty pageant consulting business known as 
The Ultimate Look. She was staked in this by some of her 
premarital assets, and some of Respondent's (Tr., at 
101-102). The Ultimate Look's assets consisted solely of a 
couple of racks of used dresses and gowns designed specially 
for use in beauty pageants. Other than earning enough money 
to repay Respondent monthly for his loan to Appellant to 
help her start her business, The Ultimate Look never earned 
a profit and went out of business (Tr., at 72, 80, 101-102). 
This is consistent with Appellant's testimony that Respon-
dent asked her not to develop very many outside interests, 
so they could be together (Tr., at 97). Respondent admitted 
he never asked Appellant to get a paying job (Tr., at 
90-91), and that, other than two part-time not-for-pay 
jobs, Appellant had not worked outside her home in her life 
(Tr., at 72). 
During their marriage, both parties lost certain 
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monies due to the depressed real estate market. However, 
Respondent still had substantial assets at the time of 
divorce, including his net monthly income of $3,381.00 (Tr., 
at 29). Appellant had lost approximately $14,000.00 equity 
in two condiminiums (Tr., at 110, 26). 
The divorce was Respondent's idea; Appellant did 
not want it (Tr., at 87). Even after the parties1 separa-
tion in May of 1987, Respondent amended his Trust Agreement 
to provide for Appellant's support for the remainder of her 
life (Tr., at 87; and Trial Exhibit 3D). This was con-
sistent with Appellant's belief that Respondent would pro-
vide support for her for the rest of her life, and of her 
frequently expressed concern about it (Tr., at 97, 98 lines 
17-25 especially). 
Both parties submitted trial exhibits showing their 
anticipated monthly expenses, each of approximately 
$1,700.00 per month [Tr., at 33-35, Trial Exhibit 11D 
(Respondent's Expenses); Tr., at 119-123, Trial Exhibit 9D 
(Appellant's Expenses). See, also, Tr. at p. 63, lines 
14-23, Respondent's agreement that $1,700.00 per month is 
reasonable for both himself and Appellant.] Appellant also 
testified and presented evidence (Trial Exhibit 15D), that 
she needed to be awarded some part of Respondent's federal 
civil service retirement benefit or survivor annuity to con-
tinue her eligibility for health insurance benefits at 
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$107.00 per month premium, which she would need because of 
preexisting health problems (Tr., at 119-122; Trial Exhibit 
15D Federal Personnel Manual System FPM Letter 890-37, 10 
pages). 
The trial judge found that Appellant's financial 
needs are approximately $1,722.00 per month to maintain a 
lifestyle exactly as she had maintained during this 
marriage, but that Respondent would have to reduce his stan-
dard of living to enable Appellant to continue in this 
lifestyle (Finding of Fact #22, R., at 139). The trial 
court also found that Appellant could earn between minimum 
wage and $2,000.00 per month, depending on how hard she 
wanted to work (Findings of Fact #16-21, R., at 138-139). 
Accordingly, the trial court awarded Appellant $700.00 per 
month alimony for five years, and that Respondent should 
maintain her as beneficiary on his federal civil service 
survivor annuity to the level of $700.00 for the five years 
(Conclusions of Law #5 and 6, R., at 142-143; Decree of 
Divorce, #5 and 6, R., at 147-148). The trial court also 
ordered Respondent to pay for $500.00 worth of Appellant's 
attorney's fees (Decree of Divorce, #22, R., at 150). 
Appellant's attorney's fees were proffered at $2,320.00 
(Tr., at 145-147). The trial court did seemingly find them 
reasonable, but felt that Appellant could pay them out of 
her Certificate of Deposit and IRA (Memorandum Decision, 
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R., at 127-128). Appellant's evidence, uncontradicted, was 
that her Certificate of Deposit was worth $21,500.00 (Tr., 
at 115-116), and less than that if she withdrew it before 
1990 (Tr., at 116). The trial court valued this Certificate 
of Deposit at $25,000.00 (Conclusion of Law #20, R., at 
144-145). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. That the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding Appellant alimony in the amount of only $700.00 per 
month and for only five years, in light of the following 
factors: Appellant's age; the length of the parties' 
marriage; Appellant's lack of income-producing assets; 
Appellant's tax liability on her alimony; Appellant's 
reasonable monthly expenses and Respondent's monthly 
expenses and income; Respondent's ability to provide 
support; Appellant's work history and medical condition. 
2. That the trial court abused its discretion in 
limiting Appellant's designation as the benficiary of 
Respondent's civil service spouse survivor annuity to 
$700.00 per month, and for only the five year alimony 
period, for the reasons mentioned in paragraph #1 above. 
3. That the trial court erred in valuing 
Appellant's Certificate of Deposit at $25,000.00, instead of 
$21,500.00, in light of Appellant's undisputed testimony 
that there were $3,500.00 worth of debts chargeable against 
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the Certificate of Deposit by virtue of Section 75-6-107 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
4. That the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding Appellant only $500.00 attorney's fees from 
Respondent, in light of the court's apparent finding of the 
reasonableness of Appellant's fees in the amount of 
$2,350.00, Respondent's more-than-ample assets and ability 
to pay the fees, and Respondent's pre trial offer of $400.00 
per month alimony for three years, which necessitated the 
trial (R., at 79). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING ONLY $700.00 PER MONTH 
ALIMONY, AND FOR ONLY FIVE YEARS. 
A trial court's award of alimony is committed to 
the sound discretion of that court, and it will not be dis-
turbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Olson v„ Olson, 
704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 
1980). This discretion, however, is not arbitrary, and if 
the award is erroneous on its face or unfair to either 
party, it can be corrected on appeal. Jones v. Jones, 
supra. 
The most important function of alimony is to pro-
vide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to 
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prevent her from becoming a public charge. English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). Bearing this in mind, 
the Utah Supreme Court has consistently articulated the fol-
lowing three factors to be considered in fixing a reasonable 
alimony award: (1) the financial conditions and needs of 
the wife; (2) the ability of the wife to produce a suffi-
cient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the husband 
to provide support, see Jones v. Jones, supra; Higley v. 
Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983); Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1978); English v. English, supra. The Utah Court 
of Appeals has likewise followed these factors, see Andersen 
v. Andersen, 85 U.A.R. 17 (Ct. App. 6/22/88); Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); Sampinos v. 
Sampinos, (Utah App. 1988). Analysed in light of these 
factors, the trial court abused it discretion in this case. 
1. The Financial Conditions and Needs of the Wife. 
Appellant has no outside income and was supported completely 
by Respondent during their marriage (Tr., at 74-75). She 
has reasonable anticipated monthly expenses of approximately 
$1,700.00 (Tr., at 119-123; Trial Exhibit 9D; Tr., at p.63, 
lines 14-23). She will have to pay income tax on her ali-
mony (Tr., at 123-124), so an award of $700.00 per month 
alimony is actually less than that. Her anticipated monthly 
expenses, as itemized, are completely in line with the stan-
dard of living she enjoyed during her marriage to the 
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Respondent (Trial Exhibit 9 D; Tr., at 82, 122-123). 
The trial court awarded Appellant what it termed 
"rehabilitative alimony" (Decree of Divorce, R., at 147-148) 
for five years, presumably meaning that Appellant should 
have a job earning $1,700.00 per month at the end of the 
five years. Since Appellant!s only other significant assets 
awarded to her were a one-half interest in an IRA, worth 
$5,952.00 (Decree of Divorce, R., at 149, #18), and the 
Certificate of Deposit, worth, as will be argued below, 
$21,500.00 (Tr., at 115-116), she will obviously have to 
spend down on those two assets at the rate of $1,000.00 per 
month to enjoy the standard to living enjoyed during the 
parties1 marriage. This will only last approximately two of 
the five years of the alimony period, leaving Appellant with 
no assets and $700.00 per month on which to live. 
Moreover, both the Certificate of Deposit and the 
IRA are the type of property regarded by this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court as non-income producing, see, e.g., 
Sampinos v. Sampinos, supra, 750 P.2d 615 at 617 ($5,000 
cash, $20,000 secured by a mortgage on a home, payable in 
semi-annual installments, household furnishings, automobile 
and inheritance not income-producing); and Jones v.. Jones, 
supra, 700 P.2d 1072, at 1075 ($10,000 cash and securities 
of relatively small value and limited liquidity not 
income-producing). 
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In light of all of the above factors, the trial 
courtfs finding that Appellantfs financial needs are approx-
imately $1,722.00 to maintain her lifestyle is supported by 
the record, but the courtfs seeming mandate that she supple-
ment her alimony by dissipating her non-income-producing 
assets, is not supported by the evidence, and is contrary to 
Utah case law. 
2. The Ability of the Wife to Produce a Sufficient 
Income for Herself. Appellant is 51 years old (Tr., at 90), 
has some potential health problems, although not currently 
serious (Tr., at 121), a history of never having worked out-
side the home prior to marrying Respondent (Tr., at 72), and 
worked only part-time during the parties1 marriage, earning 
nothing (Tr., at 72, 80, 101-102). The trial court, in 
fact, referred to this part-time work as "hobby type work" 
(Findings of Fact #16, R. at 138). 
Respondent never asked Appellant to get a paying 
job during their marriage (Tr., at 90-91), and completely 
supported Appellant and the partiesf numerous trips and gen-
eral lifestyle (Tr., at 74-75, 82, 122-123). Respondent 
told Appellant that he was providing for her nicely for the 
rest of her life, and did so in both his original Trust 
Agreement (Tr., at 97-98; Trial Exhibit 2 D), and even after 
separation when he contemplated divorce (Tr., at 87; Trial 
Exhibit 3 D). Appellant took Respondent at his word, that 
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he would provide adequate support for her for the rest of 
her life (Tr., at 97-98). It is submitted that the trial 
court ignored the real dynamics of the parties! 
relationship, to-wit: that Respondent, by his actions, 
lulled Appellant into what eventually turned out to be a 
false sense of security and then, when admittedly Respondent 
desired the divorce, not Appellant (Tr., at 87), he pulled 
the rug out from under her. Therefore, the trial court's 
finding that Appellant's "lack of employment for economic 
gain is not a result of any request made by the plaintiff" 
(Finding of Fact #17, R., at 139), misses the point. The 
only support in the record at all for this finding is 
Respondent's testimony that ". . .1 had no stipulation with 
her that she would work or wouldn't work. She was perfectly 
free to do whatever she wanted to do. . ." (Tr., at 41, 
lines 8-10). While arguably true, Respondent should have 
known that, in light of Appellant's lack of work history, 
his provision for her in the two Trust Agreements, about 
both of which he informed her, and his request that she not 
develop outside interests (Tr., at 97), that Appellant would 
not seek outside employment. 
The trial court also found that the Appellant could 
earn anywhere from a minimum wage to $2,000.00 per month 
(Findings of Fact, Nos. 18-21, R., at 138-139). There is 
absolutely no evidence in the Record to support this 
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Finding; it is simply the personal opinion and bias of the 
trial judge. The trial judge's obvious bias against the 
Appellant can be seen by reading his Memorandum Decision as 
regards Appellant's wanting to be awarded a portion of 
Respondent's survivor annuity: 
Probably the most sensitive issue 
throughout the trial is the issue of 
whether or not the plaintiff should be 
required to designate his spouse for 
spousal protection in connection with his 
federal pension. The defendant's 
pretended motivation for making this 
request is because it would permit her to 
buy health insurance for a few dollars 
less than she would otherwise be able to 
make such a purchase is not the real 
issue at stake. This pretended issue 
would effect perhaps $50.00 a month or 
perhaps even less in connection with some 
of the complications. The real issue is 
the unmentionable one that the 
plaintiff's health is very precarious, he 
has grown weaker in recent years, and has 
had some crises in his health. The chief 
motivation for desiring this continuation 
is the security it would produce in the 
event of the death of the plaintiff, for 
his ex-wife . . . R., at 127 (emphasis 
added). 
In view of Appellant's very open advocacy through-
out the trial for a longer period of alimony in a higher 
amount, the trial judge's reference to her "pretended" moti-
vation and the "unmentionable" issue shows his total disre-
gard for Appellant's very real concern about her health and 
health insurance costs in light of her lack of income. 
There is no factual basis to support this bias - it is quite 
simply, the trial judge's own personal view, not at all 
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reflected in the evidence, and it colored his decision. 
In any event, Appellant is now 51 years old at the 
time of trial, with no real marketable job skills, In a 
general sense, her situation is analogous to that of Mrs. 
Jones in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), in which 
it was observed: 
. . . She was married at the age of 2 3 
and was 52 years old at the time of 
trial. The paid work she did in the 
early years of the marriage and the mis-
cellaneous functions she performed at the 
pharmacy and gift shop were all rela-
tively unskilled in nature. During most 
of the marriage, with the full consent 
and support of her husband, she devoted 
her time to raising their four children 
and donating her services to various 
social service organizations. She has no 
professional training and few marketable 
skills. The husband managed the finances 
of both the family and the business and 
provided his wife with an allowance to 
cover her expenses . . . It is entirely 
unrealistic to assume that a woman in her 
mid 50fs with no substantial work experi-
ence or training will be able to enter 
the job market and support herself in 
anything even resembling the style in 
which the couple had been living. 700 
P.2d 1072, at 1074 (emphasis added). 
See also, the discussion of various reported statistics con-
cerning the economic reality of Appellant's type of 
situation, in Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983), at 
381. Other cases approving the language cited from Jones 
v. Jones above, when applied to the situation of women in 
their 50fs with little or no job experience, are Naranjo v. 
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988) (woman 59 years old; 
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had ulcers, but otherwise in good health; worked intermit-
tently during marriage at low paying jobs; having difficulty 
finding a job due to age and lack of skills); Sampinos v. 
Sampinos, 750 P. 2d 615 (Utah App. 1988) (woman 52 years old 
with no professional training and few marketable skills; her 
third and his second marriage; no children of the parties' 
marriage; eleven year marriage, but parties separated for 
more than four of the eleven years); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 
1985) (woman had worked only minor clerical jobs for two 
brief periods over twenty years apart). 
Viewing the evidence in light of the case law, it 
is submitted that the trial judge's finding that Appellant 
can, somehow, supplement her alimony of $700.00 per month, 
is not supported by the Record, and constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
3. The Ability of the Husband to Provide Support. 
Respondent has a monthly income of $3,381.00 after deduc-
tions for taxes, etc. (Tr., at 29). His reasonable antici-
pated monthly expenses, after the sale of the parties' 
condominium, would be $1,700.00 per month (Tr., at 33-35, 
63; Trial Exhibit 11 P). This amount of $3,381.00, less 
$1,700.00, is $1,681.00 per month. A further review of the 
trial transcript reveals that Respondent offered no evidence 
of the effect on his standard of living of his paying more 
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than $700.00 per month to Appellant. 
Despite this, the trial judge found that Respondent 
would have to reduce his standard of living in order that 
Appellant could maintain her standard of living enjoyed dur-
ing the parties1 marriage (Finding of Fact #22, R. at 139). 
This simply is not so. 
What apparently troubled the trial court was award-
ing Appellant alimony out of income derived from 
Respondent's premarital assets (Conclusion of Law #5, R., at 
142-143). Otherwise, counsel cannot understand the basis 
for the trial courtfs finding that Respondent would have to 
lower his standard of living. In any event, the trial 
court's concern was not based in law. As this Court 
observed in Sampinos v. Sampinos, supra: 
. The trial court!s allocation of 
alimony was an attempt to keep plaintiff 
from becoming a public charge and to 
realign the disparity between the defen-
dant's and plaintiff's standards of 
living. Thus we find no abuse of discre-
tion in the trial court's allocation of 
alimony from the defendant's inheritance. 
750 P.2d 615, 619. 
This is but the general rule that all property of the par-
ties is before the court in a divorce action, Section 
30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, including pre-
marital property, gifts and inheritances, Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 89 U.A.R. 7 (Sup. Ct. 8/16/88); Burke v. Burke, 
733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). 
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Thus, the alimony amount of $700.00 per month con-
stituted an abuse of discretion. It was inequitable and 
unfair also, as to its five year duration. There was no 
evidence that Appellant will have a job at the end of five 
years, only the trial court's assumption. As noted in Olson 
v. Olson, supra: 
. . . Having worked only minor clerical 
jobs for two brief periods over twenty 
years apart, she has no reasonable expec-
tation of obtaining employment two years 
hence that will enable her to support 
herself at a standard of living even 
approaching that which she had during the 
marriage. Continuing spousal maintenance 
is mandated by these circumstances . . . 
should the circumstances change in the 
future, the defendant may petition the 
court to modify the decree under its con-
tinuing jurisdiction. 704 P.2d 564, at 
567. 
See also, Jones v. Jones, supra (rehabilitative alimony 
inappropriate); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 13 31 (Utah App. 
1988). Lest Respondent point out that in Olson, Jones and 
Rasband, the marriages were of twenty years duration or 
longer, Appellant notes this Courtfs approval of a permanent 
alimony award in Sampinos v. Sampinos, supra, where the par-
ties were married for only eleven years, and separated for 
more than four of them. 
Thus, this Court can, if the Record is adequate, 
modify the Decree. Higley v. Higley, 676 P. 2d 379 (Utah 
1983); Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979). It is sub-
mitted that, although the trial judge's findings are inade-
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quate in some aspects, that the Record is adequate for this 
Court to enter the appropriate alimony of $1,250,00 to 
$1,500.00 per month, subject to the continuing jurisdiction 
of the trial court, and as a means of effecting this, order 
Respondent to maintain Appellant as his designated benefici-
ary on his federal civil service survivor annuity to that 
amount. 
POINT TWO: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING APPELLANT ONLY $500.00 IN 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
An award of attorneyfs fees in a divorce action is 
based on the need of the party and the reasonableness of the 
fees awarded, and is committed to the trial court's 
discretion. Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985); 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, the Respondent's pre trial alimony 
offer was $400.00 per month for three years (R., at 79). 
This obviously necessitated a trial on the alimony issue, 
and the trial court apparently recognized this in its 
Memorandum Decision: 
The Court follows the recommendation 
that attorney's fees be awarded in the 
amount of $500.00. The Court recognizes 
considerable litigation has taken place 
since this recommendation has been made, 
but also recognizes that this defendant 
has approximately $31,000.00 plus availa-
ble in various assets, and is able to 
carry attorney's fees above the $500.00 
level. R., at 127-128. 
The $31,000.00 to which the Court referred must have 
been the Certificate of Deposit, worth $25,000.00 in the 
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Court's evaluation, and the IRA worth about $6,000-00 for 
Appellant's one-half share. The reasonableness of 
Appellant's attorney's fees of $2,350.00 was not questioned 
by the Court, and the record contains ample evidence of the 
basis for the $2,350.00 figure (Tr., at 145-147). 
Thus, the trial court awarded Appellant only 21% of 
her attorney's fees, because of her $31,000.00 non-liquid 
assets. Of course, Appellant will have to use up those 
assets to supplement the $700.00 per month alimony award, 
and they will not last even two years. Moreover, the 
Certificate of Deposit is worth, at most, only $21,500.00 
(Tr., at 115-116); Section 75-6-107, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended. 
Appellant has lost her low monthly payment 
Riverdale condominium and her Park City condominium and all 
of the equity in them during her marriage to Respondent. 
She has no other assets. In addition, it was the Respondent 
who wanted and filed for the divorce (Tr., at 87), necessi-
tating Appellant's hiring counsel. Respondent should have 
been ordered to pay all of Appellant's attorney's fees, and 
the trial court abused its discretion in entering the order 
challenged here. This Appellate Court should also award 
Appellant her attorney's fees and costs on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant 
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respectfully prays that this Court modify the alimony to 
$1,250.00 to $1,500.00 per month, as argued above, and award 
Appellant all her attorney's fees, including those incurred 
on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \s — day of October, 1988. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
I hereby certify that on this \ Z> day of 
October, 1988, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to Robert 
L. Neeley, CAMPBELL & NEELEY, Attorney for Respondent, 2485 
Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
C^ofim.HlpiJ-
SECRETARY 
-22-
7 ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD D. GREGG, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PATRICIA J. GREGG, 
Defendant. ] 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i Case No. 99905 
5 
4: 
Plaintiff's attorney is invited to submit Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment consistent with that 
indicated below. If he has not done so within 15 days from 
receipt of this decision, then the defense attorney is invited to 
do so. 
FACTS 
1. The plaintiff had been married before. His wife 
died and he continued to raise the children. The raising of the 
children continued on into this marriage for a short period. 
2. The defendant may have been an employed person until 
she married at approximately 20 years of age. She was not 
employed during her first marriage. This marriage ended in a 
divorce. She married again and remained married that time for 
approximately 18 years. During the period between the marriages 
120 
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and throughout the second marriage she remained unemployed. She 
was also unemployed during the interval between the second 
divorce and this marriage to this plaintiff, which was for a 
little over a year. She continued to raise the children for a 
brief period after her third marriage. She has remained 
unemployed for the approximately eight years of this marriage. 
She has occupied herself helping the college in connection with 
artistic presentations and in coaching of beauty contestants. 
These endeavors did not produce income and served primarily as a 
tax shelter, to the extent that they affected the parties1 
income. 
3. Before this marriage the plaintiff had been employed 
at Hill Air Force Base as an engineer for approximately 28 1/2 
years. He remained so employed for about 18 months after this 
marriage. He was presented with an opportunity to retire early 
because of a reduction in force at the Base. He accepted this 
opportunity. He then took a job selling real estate. His primary 
motive in accepting a job selling real estate was to eventually 
qualify for social security. His earnings have been less than 
$400 per month as a real estate salesman. He does not 
particularly enjoy this endeavor. He plans to retire as soon as 
he qualifies for social security. He plans to retire as soon as 
he qualifies for a minimum pension. 
4. Each of the parties brought into this marriage 
children, and they were in their home for a few years. 
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5. The plaintiff asked for this divorce. He is careful 
not to say anything derrogatory about his wife. She is careful 
not to say anything derrogatory about her husband. The plaintiff 
has not testified as to his motives for leaving the marriage. 
The Court has observed that each of the parties are polite to one 
another throughtout the proceedings, but there does not appear to 
be any indications of affection. The actual separation was 
brought on by the plaintiff's announcement that "he intended to 
live alone". The Court does not know the exact reason for this 
decision, except as it may be suggested by the health of the 
plaintiff. 
6. The plaintiff appears to be older than his 
chronological age of 62. He has diabetes. The diabetes is 
sufficiently severe that he takes daily injections. He has a 
restricted diet. He has a history of hospitalizations because of 
insulin shock. Throughout the proceedings he appears to be 
depressed, withdrawn, and discouraged. The defendant is 
approximately 52 years of age and is somewhat overweight. She 
does speak quickly and behaves in accordance with the suggestion 
that she trains beauty contestants. She appears to be a well 
person. She is depressed over the events that threaten her 
through of the divorce situation. 
7. The plaintiff's employment future will be brief. He 
does net indicate any particular enthusiasm for the selling of 
real estate. He will retire as soon as he qualifies for social 
security. 
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8. The defendant shows no enthusiasm for entering the 
job market. She prefers the role of the wife of a successful 
man. Her lack of employment for economic gain is not a result of 
any request made by the plaintiff. The defendant has enjoyed her 
hobby-type work that involves the arts. She prefers to enjoy 
those endeavors other than facing the employment world. The 
Court does find that she is an employable person. As an example, 
many of the women of her age and intelligence take the federal 
civil service tests and go to work part time for the I.R.S. on a 
seasonable basis, which lead to other jobs. These women are 
hired off written examinations. The papers may or may not 
contain their age. This defendant is also obviously employable 
in the retail world or in any portion of industry that needs 
individuals who have skill in greeting and communicating with 
others. 
9. The parties have not accumulated any measurable 
wealth during the eight years of their marriage, except during 
the first 18 months the plaintiff was earning retirement time. 
Actually, the wealth the plaintiff now holds is the result of his 
30 years employment at Hill Air Force Base and the accumulation 
of some real estate before this marriage was entered into. 
Actually, he has lost money in real estate ventures during this 
marriage from the investment standpoint. This has not been the 
result of any lack of wisdom on his part. It is the result of a 
suppressed condominium market in the Park City vicinity, etc. 
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10. The defendant came out of her second marriage with 
child support at $100 per childf for two children, and alimony at 
$900 per month for a fixed number of years. The alimony had 
obviously been placed higher than normal in comparison with the 
child support because of the tax advantages to her ex-husband. 
She also gained some property from the divorce. It was in the 
form of real estate, etc. She was single for approximately a 
year before the courtship with this plaintiff developed. This 
marriage has lasted approximately eight years. She has 
accumulated no wealth during this marriage and has suffered some 
reversals in real estate investments. The real estate investment 
losses are not the result of the misconduct of either party. She 
continues to object to the suggestion she should work The trial 
court has struggled with the question of whether or not this 
marriage can be saved and has concluded that it cannot. The 
reason is a lack of affection evidenced on the part of either of 
the parties and the obvious lack of vigor on the part of 
plaintiff and the presence of vigor on the part of the 
defendant. The Court is convinced that the differences are 
irreconcilable. 
11. There is no real conflict between the parties as to 
the amount of wealth each of the parties now possesses or as to 
the income or income history of the each. The Domestic Relations 
Commissioner has been successful in resolving these areas, except 
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in minor matters. The Court finds that the debt owed the couple 
by the plaintiff's daughter should be awarded to the plaintiff 
inasmuch as he would have the best opportunity to collect the 
debt. The debt owed by the defendant's son to the couple on the 
car transaction of $9,500 should be awarded to the defendant in 
that she would have the best opportunity to collect it, and could 
likely collect it if she was aggressive, such as the repossessing 
of the car in question. A division of the property and payment 
of debt as such should be in compliance with the recommendation 
made by Commissioner Richards. This trial has been conducted 
because of the conflicting parties' position on the issue of 
alimony. The Court modifies the recommendation of the 
Commissioner on the question of alimony to some extent, as 
indicated below. The plaintiff presents the reverse side of the 
Woodward decision. He states that he earned this retirement 
almost entirely before he ever knew his wife. Her contribution 
in the earning of the retirement is meager. He contends that 
pursuant to the spirit of that decision he should be entitled to 
keep this property without any obligation to pay alimony because 
of its existence. He also points out that he enjoys the receipt 
of some $900 per month on a house sale and developed it fully 
before he met the defendant. He points out that his earnings are 
now at the minimal level, are very difficult for him to secure, 
and are of a limited duration and will not continue indefinitely. 
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She can earn greater wages than he can now earn. He points out 
that any alimony he may pay will be paid from his past accumlated 
wealth, from his separate pre-marital property. 
12. The defendant does not contest these basic 
contentions of the plaintiff on the issue of the source of the 
funds that might be used to pay alimony. She does contend that 
the length of the marriage, to-wit: eight to nine years, and her 
lack of training or employment history, and the lifestyle to 
which she has grown accustomed during the last nine years, 
entitles her to receive alimony even though it must come from her 
husband's pre-marital property. 
RULING 
The Court accepts the Domestic Relations Commissioner's 
recommendations in all matters except as that indicated below. 
The Court awards to the defendant and against the 
plaintiff alimony for a period not to exceed five years. This 
alimony shall be in the amount of $700. The alimony shall cease 
upon remarriage, etc., or the general limitations. The Court 
recognizes that this sum will have to be paid from plaintiff1 s 
pre-marital property. The Court believes that, in equity, the 
defendant should be given rehabilitation alimony as indicated 
above. The Court believes that if she applies herself 
intelligently, she should be rehabilitated within that time. She 
has no right to require others to work and not work herself. 
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Probably the most sensitive issue throughout the trial 
is the issue of whether or not the plaintiff should be required 
to designate his spouse for spousal protection in connection with 
his federal pension. The defendant's pretended motivation for 
making this request is because it would permit her to buy health 
insurance for a few dollars less than she would other-wise be able 
to make such a purchase is not the real issue at stake. This 
pretended issue would effect perhaps $50 a month or perhaps even 
less in connection with some of the complications. The real 
issue is the unmentionable one that the plaintiff1 s health is 
very precarious, he has grown weaker in recent years, and has had 
some crises in his health. The chief motivation for desiring 
this continuation is the security it would produce in the event 
of the death of the plaintiff, for his ex-wife. The Court orders 
plaintiff to continue to carry her as his designated spouse 
beneficiary so long as the alimony continues and to $700. The 
Court recognizes that this may cost him some additional monies. 
The Court has considered this possible cost in adjusting the 
amount of alimony awarded and the length of time it is awarded 
for. 
The Court follows the recommendation that attorney's 
fees to be awarded in the amount of $500. The Court recognizes 
considerable litigation has been taken place since this 
recommendation has been made, but also recognizes that this 
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defendant has approximately $31,000 plus available in various 
assets, and is able to carry attorney's fees above the $500 
level. 
DATED this jL^f day of March^'1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^°[ day of March, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
Robert L. Neeley 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2485 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Martin W. Custen 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2661 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
A^J^. 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
ROBERT L. KEELEY #2373 
OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-3646 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD D. GREGG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PATRICIA J. GREGG, 
Defendant. 
That trial in the above-entitled matter, having come on 
regularly for hearing on the 22nd day of March, 1988, before the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting without a jury; plaintiff, 
Donald D. Gregg, was personally present and represented by his 
attorney of record, Robert L. Neeley; defendant, Patricia J. 
Gregg, was personally present and .represented by her attorney of 
record, Martin W. Custen; that each party having been sworn and 
testified, and the Court having received certain documentary 
evidence, and having heard the arguments and representations of 
counsel; and having issued its Memorandum Decision; the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff is a bona fide resident of Weber 
County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three months 
immediately prior to commencement of this action for divorce. 
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2. That plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married on the 21st day of July, 1979, in Ogden, 
Weber County, Utah. 
3. That plaintiff has been previously married. His 
previous wife having passed away leaving plaintiff to raise their 
four children. The raising of one of these children continued on 
into this present marriage for a short period of time. 
4. That there are no children born as issue of this 
marriage, and none are expected. 
5. That defendant had been an employed person until 
she married her first husband at the age of approximately twenty 
years. Thereafter during her first marriage, she was not 
employed. Her first marriage ended in a divorce. 
6. Defendant remarried and remained married for a 
period of approximately eighteen years. During the period 
between the marriages and throughout her second marriage, she 
remained unemployed. Defendant was also unemployed during the 
interval between the second divorce and this marriage to 
plaintiff, which was for a period of time in excess of one year. 
Defendant had children by her prior marriages and continued to 
raise the children for a brief period after her marriage to 
plaintiff. 
7. The Court finds that there exists irreconciliable 
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differences between the parties for which the relationship should 
be terminated. 
8. Defendant has remained essentially unemployed for 
approximately eight years of this marriage to plaintiff. 
Defendant has kept herself occupied by helping Weber State 
College in connection with artistic presentations and in coaching 
of beauty contestants. She operated a business known as The 
Ultimate Look in connection with the beauty pageants. These 
endeavors did not produce income and served primarily as a tax 
shelter, to the extent that they effected the parties1 income. 
9. Prior to the marriage, plaintiff had been employed 
at Hill Air Force Base as a engineer for approximately 28 1/2 
years. He remained so employed for about eighteen months after 
this marriage. Plaintiff was presented with an opportunity to 
retire early because of a reduction in force at Hill Air Force 
and accepted this opportunity. Thereafter, plaintiff took a job 
as a real estate salesman with his primary motive being to 
eventually qualify for social security. The Court finds 
plaintiff's earnings to have been less than $400.00 per month as 
a real estate salesman. The Court finds that plaintiff does not 
particularly enjoy this endeavor and plans to retire as soon as 
he qualifies for a minimum pension with social security. 
10. The Court finds that plaintiff has a gross monthly 
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income of $335.00 from Wardley Real Estate, $2,557.00 from Civil 
Service Retirement, and approximately $900.00 from the Real 
Estate Contract on his home on Ross Drive, Ogden, Utah, for a 
total sum of $3,792.00 gross per month. The Court finds that 
plaintiff has a net monthly income of $3,381.00 after deducting 
Federal, State income taxes, social security and health and life 
insurance premiums. 
11. The Court finds plaintiff's present monthly 
expenses to be approximately $2,100.00 per month as outlined in 
his exhibit for monthly expenses. 
12. The Court finds that the plaintiff appears to be 
older than his chronological age of 62. Plaintiff suffers from 
diabetes and to the degree that he must take daily injections. 
Plaintiff has a restricted diet and a history of hospitalizations 
as a result of insulin shock. 
13. Throughout these proceedings, the Court finds the 
plaintiff to be depressed, withdrawn and discouraged. 
14. The Court finds the defendant to be approximately 
52 years of age and is somewhat overweight. Defendant does speak 
quickly and behaves in accordance with the suggestion that she 
trains beauty contestants. 
15. The Court finds the defendant to be a well person 
although she is depressed over the events that threaten her as a 
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result of this divorce situation. 
16. The Court finds the defendant shows no enthisuam 
for entering the job market and prefers the role of being a wife 
to a successful man. The Court finds that defendant has enjoyed 
her hobby type work that involves the arts and prefers to enjoy 
those endeavors rather than facing the employment world. 
17. The Court finds that her present lack of 
employment is not as a result of any request made by this 
plaintiff. 
18. The Court does find the defendant is an employable 
person. The Court finds that many of the women of her age and 
intelligence take the Federal Service Civil Service tests and 
perhaps work part time for the Internal Revenue Service on a 
seasonal basis, which leads to other jobs. Such women are hired 
off written examinations and applications which may or may not 
contain reference to their age. 
19. The Court finds that the defendant is also 
obviously employable in the retail world or in any portion of 
private industry that needs individual who have the skills in 
greeting and communicating with others. 
20. The Court finds the defendant continues to object 
to the suggestion that she should obtain employment. 
21. The Court finds that defendant can earn either a 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
GREGG VS. GREGG 
Civil No. 99905 
minimum wage salary or to the sum of $2,000.0 0 a month depending 
upon how hard she wants to work. 
22. The Court finds that defendant's financial needs 
are approximately $1,722.00 per month to maintain a lifestyle 
exactly as she has maintained during her marriage to plaintiff. 
However, the Court finds plaintiff will have to reduce his 
standard of living in order that defendant will maintain the 
exact standard of living she has enjoyed the last eight years of 
marriage. 
23. The Court finds that the parties have purchased 
a condominium situated at 5545 S. 1000 E., Ogden, Utah during the 
course of their marriage of which plaintiff paid the down payment 
and financing cost from his pre-marital assets. 
24. The Court finds the parties have not accumulated 
any measurable wealth during the eight years of marriage except 
during the first eighteen months that plaintiff was earning 
retirement at Hill Air Force Base. 
25. The Court finds the actual wealth of plaintiff now 
holds is the result of his thirty years of employment at Hill Air 
Force Base and the accumulation of some real estate acquired 
before this marriage. 
26. The Court finds that plaintiff has lost money in 
real estate ventures during this marriage not as a result of any 
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lack of wisdom on his part but as a result of the suppressed real 
estate market. 
27. The Court finds that defendant was awarded as a 
result of her second divorce child support at the rate of $100.00 
per month per child for two children and alimony at $900.00 per 
month for seven years at which time alimony was to automatically 
terminate. The Court finds the alimony awarded in that divorce 
to be placed higher than normal in comparison with child support 
because of certain tax advances afforded to her ex-husband. 
28. The Court finds that defendant gained some 
property from her second marriage in the form of real estate, 
automobiles and household furniture and furnishings. 
29. The Court finds that defendant was single for 
approximately one year before the courtship with the plaintiff, 
Donald D. Gregg. The Court finds that this marriage lasted 
approximately eight years prior to separation, and that defendant 
has accumulated no wealth during this marriage and has suffered 
some reversals in real estate investments. 
30. The Court finds the real estate investments and 
losses are not as a result of misconduct of either party but due 
to the present real estate market. 
31. The Court finds there is no real conflict between 
the parties as to the amount of wealth and property each of the 
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parties now possess or as to the income or income history of 
each. 
32. The Court finds the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner has been successful in resolving these areas except 
in minor manners. 
33. The Court finds this trial has been conducted 
because of the parties conflicting position on the issue of 
alimony. 
34. The Court finds that the debt owed the parties by 
the plaintiff's daughter should be awarded to the plaintiff 
inasmuch as he would have the best opportunity to collect the 
same. 
35. The Court finds the debt owed by the defendant's 
son to the parties on his automobile of $9,500.00 shoula be 
awarded to defendant as she would likely have the best 
opportunity to collect it. The Court finds that debt to be 
payable at the rate of $250.00 per month for approximately four 
years. The Court finds that she could likely collect it if she 
acted in an aggressive manner such as repossessing the car in 
question if necessary. 
36. The Court finds division of the property and 
payment of the debts should be in compliance with the 
recommendation of the Domestic Relations Commissioner. 
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Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact/ the Court now 
makes and enter its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff shall be granted a Decree of Divorce 
on the grounds of irreconciliable differences; the same to become 
final upon entry. 
2. That the proceeds from sale of the condominium 
situated at 5545 S. 1000 E., Ogden, Utah shall be awarded to 
plaintiff when the sale is finalized in July, 1988. Defendant 
shall have the right to use and occupy the premises until at 
least June 30, 1988 as no prospective purchaser may occupy the 
same until July 1, 1988. Plaintiff shall maintain the payments 
on said condominium including the mortgage and second mortgage/ 
maintenance fees together with utility costs. 
3. That when the condominium at 5545 S. 1000 E. f 
Ogdenf Utah is sold/ the first and second mortgages are to be 
paid and discharged. 
4. That plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of 
$300.00 per month temporary alimony as long as she is occupying 
the condominium and is ordered to pay the first and second 
mortgage/ maintenance fee, and utility payments thereon until the 
condominium is sold. 
5. If the sale of the home is finalized in Julyf 1988 
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as contemplated/ then commencing with the month of July, 1988 and 
continuing thereafter for a period of five yearsf plaintiff 
shall pay to defendant the sum of $700.00 per month alimony. The 
Court recognizes this sum will have to be paid from plaintiff's 
pre-marital property but believes that defendant should be given 
rehabilitative alimony. 
6. Plaintiff shall name defendant as a designated 
beneficiary so long as the alimony continues and to the sum of 
$700.00 per month for that period of time. 
7. Plaintiff shall assume and pay The Ultimate 
Look indebtedness which is part of the second mortgage. 
8. That defendant is awarded the right to receive 
payment of the indebtedness of $9,500.00 from her sonf Robert 
Tippin/ in connection with the automobile loan made to him. 
9. That each party shall be awarded the personal 
property/ household furniture, furnishings/ and personal effects 
that each party acquired prior to their marriage. 
10. That defendant may be awarded the condominium 
situated at Prospector's Square No. 44/ Park Cityf Summit Countyf 
Utah. 
11. That defendant may be awarded the 1986 Toyota 
Camra, motor vehicle valued at $10,500.00. 
12. That defendant may be awarded the modeling agency 
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known as The Ultimate Look together with all assets connected 
therewith. 
13. That plaintiff shall assume and discharge the 1987 
tax obligation of approximately $2,100.00. 
14. That plaintiff is awarded 100% of his civil 
service retirement. 
15. That plaintiff is awarded the 1979 Chevrolet 
Pickup valued at $2,700.00. 
16. That plaintiff is awarded Lot 62, Beus Hill 
Subdivision, valued at $31,000.00 as it was his property acquired 
prior to marriage to defendant. 
17. That plaintiff is awarded the Prowler Trailer 
valued at $7,000.00. 
18. That the IRA accounts totaling $11,905.00 are 
to be divided equally, and that each party shall be awarded the 
sum of $5,952.00. 
19. That plaintiff is awarded the balance of 
approximately $4,100.00 in the America First Credit Union, the 
boat motor which is valued at approximately $1,000.00, the cash 
surrender value and Northwestern Life Insurance in the 
approximate sum of $5,000.00 which insurance policy was acquired 
prior to the parties1 marriage. 
20. That defendant is awarded the TV, VCR, computer, 
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having a value between approximately $1,600.00 to $3,200.00 and 
the certificate of deposit in the amount of $25,000.00 which she 
inherited from her aunt. 
21. Plaintiff is not ordered to pay for defendant's 
medical plan but she is entitled to exercise rights and 
privileges afforded her under plaintiff's medical plan. 
22. That plaintiff is ordered to contribute the sum of 
$500.00 toward defendant's attorney fees. 
DATED this day of May, 1988. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JOHN V. WAHLQUIST / 
DISTRICT COURT JUBG-E 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373 
OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-3646 
7^L 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD D. GREGGf 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PATRICIA J. GREGG, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 99905 
That trial in the above-entitled matter, having come on 
regularly for hearing on the 22nd day of March, 1988, before the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting without a jury; plaintiff, 
Donald D. Gregg, was personally present and represented by his 
attorney of record, Robert L. Neeley; defendant, Patricia J. 
3regg, was personally present and represented by her attorney of 
record, Martin W. Custen; that each party having been sworn and 
testified, and the Court having received certain documentary 
evidence, and having heard the arguments and representations of 
counsel; and having issued its Memorandum Decision; the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, and having made and signed 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of 
Divorce on the grounds of irreconciliable differences; the same 
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to become final upon entry. 
2. That the proceeds from sale of the condominium 
situated at 5545 S. 1000 E., Ogden, Utah is hereby awarded to 
plaintiff when the sale is finalized in July, 1988. Defendant 
shall have the right to use and occupy the premises until at 
least June 30, 1988 as no prospective purchaser may occupy the 
same until July 1, 1988. Plaintiff shall maintain the payments 
on said condominium including the mortgage and second mortgage, 
maintenance fees together with utility costs. 
3. That when the condominium at 5545 S. 1000 E., 
Ogden, Utah is sold, the first and second mortgages are to be 
paid and discharged. 
4. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to 
defendant the sum of $300.00 per month temporary alimony as long 
as she is occupying the condominium and he is ordered to pay the 
first and second mortgage, maintenance fee, and utility payments 
thereon until the condominium is sold. 
5. If the sale of the home is finalized in July, 1988 
as contemplated, then commencing with the month of July, 1988 and 
continuing thereafter for a period of five years, plaintiff 
shall pay to defendant the sum of $7 00.0 0 per month alimony. The 
Court recognizes this sum will have to be paid from plaintifffs 
pre-marital property but believes that defendant should be given 
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rehabilitative alimony. 
6. Plaintiff shall name defendant as a designated 
beneficiary so long as the alimony continues and to the sum of 
$700.00 per month for that period of time. 
7. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to assume and pay for 
The Ultimate Look indebtedness which is part of the second 
mortgage. 
8. That defendant is hereby awarded the right to 
receive payment of the indebtedness of $9,500.00 from her son, 
Robert Tippin, in connection with the automobile loan made to 
him. 
9. That each party is herey awarded the personal 
property^ household furniture, furnishings, and personal effects 
that each party acquired prior to their marriage. 
10. That defendant is hereby awarded the condominium 
situated at Prospector's Square No. 44, Park City, Summit County, 
Utah. 
11. That defendant is hereby awarded the 1986 Toyota 
Camra, motor vehicle valued at $10,500.00. 
12. That defendant is hereby awarded the modeling 
agency known as The Ultimate Look together with all assets 
connected therewith. 
13. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to assume and 
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discharge the 1987 tax obligation of approximately $2,100.00. 
14. That plaintiff is hereby awarded 100% of his civil 
service retirement. 
15. That plaintiff is hereby awarded the 1979 
Chevrolet Pickup valued at $2,700.00. 
16. That plaintiff is hereby awarded Lot 62, Beus Hill 
Subdivision, valued at $31,000.00 as it was his property acquired 
prior to marriage to defendant. 
17. That plaintiff is hereby awarded the Prowler 
Trailer valued at $7,000.00. 
18. That the IRA accounts totaling $11,905.00 are 
to be divided equally, and that each party is hereby awarded the 
sum of $5,952.00. 
19. That plaintiff is hereby awarded the balance of 
approximately $4,100.00 in the America First Credit Union, the 
approximate sum of $4,911.00, the boat motor which is valued at 
approximately $1,000.00, the cash surrender value and 
Northwestern Life Insurance in the approximate sum of $5,000.00 
which insurance policy was acquired prior to the parties1 
marriage. 
20. That defendant is awarded the TV, VCR, computer, 
having a value between approximately $1,600.00 to $3,200.00 and 
the certificate of deposit in the amount of $25,000.00 which she 
inherited from her aunt. 
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21. Plaintiff is not ordered to pay for defendant's 
medical plan but she is entitled to exercise rights and 
privileges afforded her under plaintiff1s medical plan. 
22. That plaintiff is ordered to contribute the sum of 
$500.00 toward defendant1^ attorney fees. 
DATED this / (v day of May, 198#. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MARTIN (tf. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
